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I. INTRODUCTION
In the context of this conference on “California in the Spotlight:
Successes and Challenges in Climate Change Law,” we turn to carbon
regulation in the Star Wars galaxy.1 In The Empire Strikes Back, Han
Solo was frozen in carbonite by Boba Fett and transported to Jabba the
Hutt,2 which gravely affected Han’s constitution.3 Princess Leia and Luke
Skywalker eventually rescued him in Return of the Jedi.4 Relevant to the
California carbon analysis herein, Carbonite also is a brand name for
impenetrable, encrypted high security.5 Without delving into who is
assuming the role of Jabba the Hutt or which side is the “Empire” in
1. This series of galactic battles is particularly relevant to the conference’s spotlight on
California’s regulation of carbon—perhaps even more so now since California’s George
Lucas in 2013 sold the rights to the Star Wars franchise, including the patented molecule
carbonite, to the Walt Disney company for $4 billion. See Devin Leonard, How Disney
Bought Lucasfilm—and Its Plans for ‘Star Wars,’ BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (Mar. 09,
2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-07/how-disney-bought-lucasfilmand-its-plans-for-star-wars.
2. In the Star Wars movies, carbon-freezing was the process of freezing stored
tibanna gas in carbonite to preserve it while it was being transported over long distances.
“To freeze a being solid, then hang him on a wall like some trophy?” Han Solo, Star Wars.
See Carbon-freezing Definition, WOOKIEEPEDIA THE STAR WARS WIKI, http://starwars.
wikia.com/wiki/Carbon-freezing (last visited Feb 04, 2014). “Oh, they’ve encased him in
carbonite. He should be quite well protected. If he survived the freezing process, that is.”
C-3PO, Star Wars. Id.
3. Id. “Just relax for a moment. You’re free of the carbonite. Shh. You have
hibernation sickness.” “I can’t see.” — Leia Organa and Han Solo. Hibernation Sickness
Definition, WOOKIEPEDIA THE STAR WARS WIKI, http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Hibernation
_sickness (last visited Feb. 04, 2014).
4. See Han Solo Definition, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Han_Solo
(last visited Feb. 04, 2014).
5. Carbonite has also been taken as the name of a company which provides highlysecure data centers, guarded around the clock. See CARBONITE, www.carbonite.com (last
visited Feb. 04, 2014).
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California’s ongoing carbon battles, the California carbon control program
has been in carbonite legal limbo concocted under:




The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
The dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
and
State administrative law (including state environmental
requirements).

California has prevailed in less than half of these legal attacks in this
trilogy; the program has been delayed by a year6 in legal carbonite and
inhibited in other regards. More specifically, California has been
challenged pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution
regarding regulation of its electric power generation facilities and liquid
fuels in six significant suits. California settled in favor of challengers or
lost at the trial stage in five of these six, while the sixth matter was
dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of the claim,
leaving the plaintiffs to re-file the complaint.7 In addition, California was
challenged as to whether its regulatory actions regarding sustainable
energy fuels violate the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
It lost this case at the trial level, but the decision recently was reversed 21 on appeal with a dissent supporting the trial court,8 and currently is
pending an appeal. California sustainable energy policy has recently
undergone seven significant legal challenges under California state law;
California already either settled in favor of challengers or lost three of the
five of these challenges, while one was sidetracked on procedural grounds
without reaching the merits of the claim.9
In terms of Constitutional requirements, there were numerous articles
signaling California about implementing its carbon program carefully to
avoid certain trip wires.10 California was the last, by a span of four years, of
6. See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487,
1491 (2012).
7. See infra Section II.
8. See infra Section III.
9. See infra Section IV.
10. Steven Ferrey, Goblets of Fire: Potential Constitutional Impediments to the
Regulation of Global Warming, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 835 (2008); Steven Ferrey, Chad
Laurent & Cameron Ferrey, Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon Control
Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 125 (2010);
Brian Potts, Regulating Greenhouse Gas ‘Leakage’: How California Can Evade the
Impending Constitutional Attacks, 25 ELECTRICITY J. 7, 43 (2006) (“. . .because of these
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11 states in the U.S. to regulate carbon emissions.11 California’s carbon
regulation is very broad and affects more sectors of the economy, because the
scope of green house gas (GHG) emissions regulated by California
includes more gases than other states.12 California regulates GHG emission
from all aspects of its economy, not just power generators as done in many
other states.13 California is the twelfth largest GHG producing political
region in the world,14 making it larger in its carbon emissions than each
of two-thirds of the Annex I developed nations regulated under the Kyoto
Protocol.15
This Article thaws several legal layers of California carbonite, tranche- bytranche, and examines the legal fabric. First, in Section II we examine federal
Constitutional challenges to California’s A.B. 32 and sustainable energy
statutes under the Supremacy Clause. Section III analyzes litigation against
California carbon control pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution. Section IV analyzes challenges to the California regulation
pursuant to state law violations, distinguishing those which proceed from
the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and those which utilize
other state administrative laws to challenge California’s carbon choices
and implementation. Section V examines the trilogy of litigation set forth in
Sections II –IV as to next steps and implications for state policy.
II. A “BRIGHT LINE”
In contrast to state law claims,16 Constitutional challenges raise issues
of the basic power—or lack thereof—of California to take certain regulatory
actions regarding energy or sustainable energy. Transgressions of basic
perimeters of state Constitutional jurisdiction and authority cannot be
remedied by changes in state law or a quick re-initiation under state
two Constitutional issues, courts are likely to strike down many or all of their proposals”);
Steven Ferrey, Chad Laurent and Cameron Ferrey, FIT in the U.S.A., PUBLIC UTILITIES
FORTNIGHTLY, June 2010; Steven Ferrey, Shaping American Power: Federal Preemption
and Technological Change, 11 U. VA. ENVTL. L.J. 47 (1991); Steven Ferrey, Follow the
Money! Article I and Article VI Constitutional Barriers to Renewable Energy in the U.S.
Future , VA. J.L. & TECH. 89 (2012).
11. Goblets of Fire, supra note 11, at 844–45 (noting ten states participating in the
RGGI program prior to California’s program).
12. See CAL. CODE OF REGS, tit. 17, § 95,802 (2012).
13. Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions Act, CA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY AIR RESOURCES BOARD, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm.
14. ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N & CAL. PUB. UTIL’S., PROPOSED
FINAL OPINION SUMMARY ON GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATORY STRATEGIES 2 (2008).
15. See UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, NATIONAL
GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY DATA FOR THE PERIOD 1990-2011 14 (2013), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/sbi/eng/19.pdf.
16. See infra Section IV.
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administrative process. State regulatory actions regarding energy that
cross Constitutional limits render the law invalid.
A. Recent California Energy Regulation
After enacting a feed-in-tariff requiring California state utilities to make
wholesale power purchases from cogeneration facilities at well in excess
of wholesale rates for power and in excess of federally defined “avoided
costs,”17 there was a challenge at the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) as to whether this violated the Federal Power Act
and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
1. The Federal Power Act Distinctions
The Federal Power Act sections 205 and 206 18 empower FERC
exclusively to regulate rates for the interstate and wholesale sale and
transmission of electricity.19 The Federal Power Act directs FERC to
regulate all interstate electricity transmission and to ensure the reliability
of the national electricity grid.20 The U.S. Supreme Court held that
Congress meant to draw a “bright line,” easily ascertained and not requiring
case-by-case analysis, demarcating exclusive state and federal jurisdiction.21
When a transaction is subject to exclusive federal FERC jurisdiction and
regulation, state regulation is preempted by the U.S. Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause, according to a long-standing and consistent line of

17. 18 C.F.R § 292.304 (2013).
18. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(d)-824(e) (2006).
19. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Public Utility District
No. 1, 128 S. Ct. 2733 (2008).
20. 16 U.S.C. §§ 797, 824(a), 824(a-2) (2006).
21. Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964).
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rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court:22 “FERC has exclusive authority to set
and determine the reasonableness of wholesale rates.”23
The Federal Power Act defines “sale at wholesale” as any sale to any
person for resale.24 States, however, retain authority over retail electric
sales because “FERC’s jurisdiction over the sale of power has been
specifically confined to the wholesale market.”25 If states impose a power
sale rate in excess of “avoided cost” by either “law or policy,” the “contracts
will be considered to be void ab initio.”26 The rates, terms, and provisions of
any wholesale sale, or transmission of electricity in interstate commerce, are
exclusively within federal jurisdiction and control, not state authority,
pursuant to the Federal Power Act,27 it does not make any difference
whether a state acts through its legislature or its energy regulatory agency.28
The Supreme Court in 1986,29 1988,30 2003,31 and 2008,32 reaffirmed
and enforced the Filed Rate Doctrine as applied through the Supremacy
Clause, when states attempted to assert jurisdiction in areas subject
to FERC’s exclusive authority. In the most recent of these cases, the
Supreme Court in 2008 reiterated that the Federal Power Act creates a

22. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982). The
Supreme Court overturned an order of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission
that restrained within the state, for the financial advantage of in-state ratepayers, low-cost
hydroelectric energy produced within the state. It held this to be an impermissible
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Sec. 8,
clause 3 and the Federal Power Act: “Our cases consistently have held that the commerce clause
of the Constitution precludes a state from mandating that its residents be given a preferred
right of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located within its borders
or to the products derived therefrom.” Id. at 338. Mont.-Dakota Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv.
Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951), Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953
(1986); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988); Entergy La.,
Inc., v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 47-50 (2003).
23. Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 371 (1988)( “FERC has exclusive
authority to determine the reasonableness of wholesale rates.”); accord Pub. Util. Dist. No.
1, Washington v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1066 (2006) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1, 128 S. Ct. 2733 (2008).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (2006).
25. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 19 (2002) (italics omitted).
26. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 70 FERC ¶¶ 61,012, 61,029–61,030 (1995).
27. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 340 (1982).
28. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. et al. v. State Energy Res. Conservation and Dev. Comm’n et
al., 461 U.S. 190, 204, 215 (1983).
29. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 963 (1986).
30. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988).
31. Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 51 (2003).
32. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527,
531–32 (2008).
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“‘bright line’ between state and federal jurisdiction with wholesale power
sales . . . falling on the federal side of the line.”33
2. The 2010 California Power Purchase Tariff
California mandated that its utilities, and ultimately their captive
ratepayers, pay above-market rates to certain generators using on-site
distributed combined heat and power production facilities for their electric
generation sold in a wholesale transaction to the utilities. California
argued that its environmental purpose for regulation should make it exempt
from preemption in setting above-market wholesale feed-in renewable
tariff rates for cogeneration facilities of less than 20 Mw and that
environmental costs could be considered to inflate avoided costs.34 The
affected utilities and others countered that federal law does not allow state
regulation of wholesale sales to achieve state environmental goals, that
federal preemption cannot be avoided based on an environmental purpose
of the preempted state regulation, and states may not under the guise of
environmental regulation adopt an economic regulation that requires
purchase of electricity at a wholesale price outside the framework of the
Federal Power Act, or if acting under PURPA, at a price that exceeds
“avoided cost.”35
FERC36 summarily rejected all of California’s arguments regarding
generic environmental rationales for Constitutional violations of wholesale
rates in excess of limits under federal law or as established by FERC. 37
After losing before FERC, California moved for FERC rehearing, or in
the alternative a clarification of this FERC order.38 While FERC dismissed a
rehearing of whether California had authority over preempted wholesale
power sale rates,39 FERC did issue a clarification that in no way altered

33. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1066 (2006), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part sub nom. Morgan Stanley Capital Group, 554 U.S. at 531 (citing the separate
Supreme Court opinions in Nantahala, Southern California Edison, and Mississippi
Power).
34. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,047, ¶¶ 6–7 (2010).
35. Id. ¶ 52.
36. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,047 (2010).
37. Id. ¶ 64.
38. S. Cal. Edison Co., 133 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,059, ¶ 2 (2010), (Granting Clarification
and Dismissing Rehearing).
39. Id. ¶¶ 15, 19.
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its original legal finding. FERC reaffirmed that FERC has “exclusive
jurisdiction.”40
FERC reiterated that only the federal government can regulate commerce
between the states and California cannot attempt to regulate commerce
outside its borders.41 There is precedent regarding California decisions
fifteen years earlier finding preemption as constitutionally not allowed for
certain California clean energy regulation altering wholesale renewable
prices.42 Under the Filed-Rate Doctrine, any dispute about these matters
may not be arbitrated by the state, but is reserved exclusively to federal
authority.43
The federal Court of Appeals agreed with the above decision when it
previously decided a different recent California case.44 While this decision
proceeded on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court45 and thereafter was
remanded to FERC for more clarification,46 this element was not overturned
when before the Supreme Court. The court ruled that Congress did not
intend that the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction over the interstate sale of
electricity at wholesale be determined by a case-by-case analysis of the
impact of state regulation on national interests.47
B. Other California Challenges
1. Federal Preemption of California Authority
In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a city in California was
preempted under the Supremacy Clause by the Federal Aviation
Administration Act of 1994 from imposing additional regulation on
diesel truck emissions for those trucks that accessed the port.48 While
addressing state/local environmental regulation, the Supreme Court held,
in striking the California law, that federal law is preemptive of state and
local law. This makes for an interesting comparison to the almost

40. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, supra note 37, ¶ 72 n.99 (citing FPC v. Southern California
Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964)).
41. Id.
42. Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 36 F.3d 848, 853
(9th Cir. 1994); S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215, at 61,677 (1995).
43. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988).
44. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).
45. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527 (2008).
46. Both the P.U.D. No. 1 and Morgan Stanley orders remanded the cases to FERC.
See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., 554 U.S. at 555 (2008).
47. See also Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964).
48. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 2096, 2105 (2013).
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simultaneous decision of the Ninth Circuit, in another legal challenge to
A.B. 32.49
2. Truck and Bus Regulation Litigation
The California Dump Truck Owners Association (“CDTOA”) filed suit
in federal court in 2011 to challenge CARB’s Truck and Bus Regulation,
which provides for stricter emissions standards for dump trucks and other
diesel-fuel vehicles. 50 The suit alleged that the regulation is
unconstitutional because it is preempted by the Federal Aviation
Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”). In December 2012, a
district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and
dismissed the case on procedural grounds rather than reaching the merits
of the claims.51
The district court determined that the EPA was a necessary and
indispensable party to the litigation due to the EPA’s interests in the State
Implementation Plan of California, which requires federal approval, and
at which point it becomes a matter not only of state law, but also of federal
law.52 Because the federal district court could not grant any practical
relief without joining the EPA, but claims challenging the EPA’s final
decisions must be brought in the federal court of appeals, the district court
concluded that the action could not proceed without necessary parties and
should be dismissed.53
The CDTOA said it will file a petition for review with the Ninth Circuit
challenging EPA’s approval of the California State Implementation Plan
(SIP) under the theory that the SIP impermissibly conflicts with other
49. See infra Section IV.
50. Cal. Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. Nichols, 924 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1131 (E.D.
Cal. 2012) (The regulation requires particulate matter retrofits beginning in 2012, and will
require replacement of older vehicles beginning in 2015. Plaintiffs complained that the
$150,000 needed for a new CARB-compliant truck and the dramatically decreased value
of old trucks unfairly burdened small business owners, influenced who could enter the
industry, and thus conflicted with express terms of the FAAA.) Id. at 1134.
51. Id. at 1136, 1137 (According to the court, a decision favoring CDTOA would
undermine the validity of EPA’s approval of California’s State Implementation Plan (“SIP”)
under the Clean Air Act because the Truck and Bus Regulation is part of California’s SIP.
Since exclusive jurisdiction of final Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) decisions,
such as SIP approval, lies with the court of appeals, the District Court concluded it lacked
jurisdiction).
52. Id. at 1149–50.
53. Id. at 1150.
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federal laws, specifically, the FAAAA and the Constitution’s Commerce
Clause. While its language may preempt state regulation in the form of
controls on who can enter the trucking industry within a state, it does not
appear to limit a state’s ability to regulate emission standards.54 CDTOA was
also seeking an injunction to prevent CARB’s ability to enforce the
regulation, as the newly imposed regulations would impair and already
struggling regional industry and economy and have further alleged
devastating effects.55 This was because the regulations essentially require
all diesel-powered vehicles utilized in the industry to be replaced with
new CARB-compliant vehicles.56
In the four California matters mentioned in the sections above, dealing
with the borders of federal and state authority over energy and environmental
matters, federal authority preempted state authority in all but one of these
cases,57 and the other was procedurally dismissed, without reaching the
merits, because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Two of the four
decisions above were rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court.58 Article VI, the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, and the Federal Power Act,59 establish
a judicially defined “bright line” prohibition of state regulation of
wholesale transactions in power.60 State regulation proceeding beyond this
jurisdictional border, if challenged, is suspended in carbonite.
III. STATE REGULATORY DISCRIMINATION AFFECTING COMMERCE
A. The Precedent
1. Historic Precedent
Even where a particular energy regulation is within state authority, it
still must be applied within the constraints of the dormant Commerce
54. Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103305, § 601, 108 Stat. 1569, 1605, 1606 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
55. Tina Grady Barbacchia, CA Dump Truck Owners Association Sues CARB,
BETTER ROADS (last visited July 28, 2013) available at http://www.betterroads.com/cadump-truck-owners-association-sues-carb/.
56. Id.
57. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., 554 U.S. at 527; Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n,
36 F.3d at 853; S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215 (1995); Re Cal. Public Utils.
Comm’n et al., 133 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,059 (2010); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 133 S. Ct. at 2096;
Cal. Dump Truck Owners Ass’n, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
58. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., 554 U.S. at 527; Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 133 S. Ct.
at 2096.
59. 16 U.S.C. § 791a-825r (1920).
60. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“the laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”).
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Clause, so as not to unduly burden interstate commerce within the United
States, pursuant to Article I of the Constitution.61 The dormant Commerce
Clause prohibits actions that are facially discriminatory or unduly
burdensome against interstate commerce.62 The Supreme Court held that
statutes which establish regional barriers (not necessarily just one-state
isolation) and discriminate only against some states, rather than all states,
violate the Commerce Clause.63 Facially geographically discriminatory
statutes are reviewed subject to judicial “strict scrutiny,” and for such a
statute or regulation to be valid, the state must establish that the statute
serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means
affecting commerce to achieve that interest.64
The Supreme Court held that a government agency cannot discriminate
against interstate commerce “if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives,
adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available.”65 For such a
statute or regulation to be upheld, the state usually must establish that there
is a compelling state interest for which the statute is the least intrusive means
to achieve that interest: 66 However, “even if environmental preservation
were the central purpose of the pricing order, that would not be sufficient
to uphold a discriminatory regulation.”67
State statutes or regulation found to discriminate against out-of-state
interests based on geography or favoring local interests, are found to be

61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
62. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (quoting Oregon
Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envt’l Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 100 (1994)).
63. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
64. There was an argument advanced that courts would not apply strict scrutiny to
an RPS that bases eligibility on a generator’s ability to produce benefits for a state rather
than the geographic origin of the electricity. NANCY RADER & SCOTT HEMPLING, THE
RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD: A PRACTICAL GUIDE app. A, at 4 (2001). However,
the Supreme Court does not always accept the stated state purpose disavowing facial
discrimination and strict scrutiny. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S.
88, 105 (1992) (“In assessing the impact of a state law on the federal scheme, we have
refused to rely solely on the legislature’s professed purpose and have looked as well to the
effects of the law.”); Norris v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1150 (1st Cir.
1989).
65. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
66. Trevor D. Stiles, Renewable Resources and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 4
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 33, 59 (2009) (outlining a history of the dormant Commerce
Clause).
67. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 204 n.20 (1994).
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per se invalid.68 State and local laws are deemed unconstitutional under
the dormant Commerce Clause when a law differentiates between in-state
and out-of-state economic interests in a manner that benefits the former
and burdens the latter. 69 If the statute is geographically even-handed
facially and in effect, the courts apply the Pike balancing test to determine
whether the state’s interest justifies the incidental discriminatory effect of
the regulatory mechanism, as applied.70 Even when there is no obvious or
overt facial discrimination against out-of-state or other geographically- based
interests, where the effect or purpose is to discriminate, the ultimate impact
is enough to make the regulation unconstitutional.71
Laws that attempt to regulate the conduct of out-of-state businesses also
violate the Commerce Clause.72 These laws can assume the form of added
taxes and charges on out-of-state goods. 73 States are prohibited from
attaching restrictions to any goods that they import from other states:
“States and localities may not attach restrictions to . . . imports in order to
control commerce in other States.”74
Where a state statute provided a tax exemption for sales of two types of
wine, both produced from products produced in the state, even though not
needing to mention the state by name, the effect was practically statespecific discrimination, and it was found to be discriminatory, and a
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.75 A state cannot regulate to
favor or require use of, its own in-state energy resources even for a small
percentage of total use,76 nor can it, by regulation, harbor energy-related
resources originating in the state.77 States cannot require use of in-state
fuels even for the purpose of satisfying federal Clean Air Act
68. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (noting that
if a statute is facially discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid); Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997).
69. See Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99.
70. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970 ) (explaining the
balancing test for when a statute “regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental”).
71. C. & A. Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Hunt v.
Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
72. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326–27, 343 (1989) (striking
requirement that the price of beer was not higher than that charged out-of-state).
73. See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 336–37 (1992)
(invalidating an Alabama law imposing an extra fee on imported hazardous waste).
74. Carbone v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994).
75. Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1984); see also Carbone, 511
U.S. at 393.
76. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–55 (1992). The Oklahoma statute
overturned involved only a 10% allocation of the market to in-state producers. See also
Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
77. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982).
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requirements.78 Income tax credits cannot be given by a state only to instate producers of fuel additives.79
2. Recent Precedent
The Supreme Court consistently has required that the regulation of
power by the states must not discriminate regarding the origin of power
or the ultimate impact, which may discourage its flow in interstate
commerce.80 Recent federal court opinions construing state electric
regulation have scrupulously followed this doctrine.81
Most recently, Justice Richard Posner, for the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, in a unanimous decision, affirmed the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s approval of the Midwest Independent Service Operator’s
(MISO)82 proportionate customer utility allocation of transmission costs
for high-voltage transmission lines to move renewable wind power to
populated areas.83 For authority that supports its holding on the respective
jurisdiction of state and federal government to regulate electricity, the
opinion relied on a 2012 law review article authored by Professor Ferrey.84
The decision declared unconstitutional a state that limited state renewable
portfolio standards to in-state generation, as a violation of the Commerce
Clause: it “trips over an insurmountable constitutional objection. Michigan
cannot, without violating the commerce clause of Article I of the
Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy.”85
78. Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 596–97 (7th Cir. 1995).
79. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 278–80 (1988).
80. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 335, 344 (1982)
(overturning as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause an order of the state Public
Utilities Commission that restrained within the state for the financial advantage of in-state
ratepayers, renewable power produced within the state).
81. See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F. Supp. 2d 183,
(2d Cir. 2013).
82. MISO’s service area extends from the Canadian border, east to Michigan and
parts of Indiana, south to northern Missouri, and west to eastern areas of Montana.
83. Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 773, 781 (7th Cir. June 7,
2013) MISO allocated the costs of the transmission projects among all of the utilities who
draw power from the MISO grid in proportion to each utilities’ overall volume of usage;
FERC approved MISO’s rate design, which led some states to initiate court appeal.
84. Id. at 776 (citing to article by Professor Steven Ferrey).
85. Id. Michigan actually initiated the issue of in-state electric power discrimination in
its RPS program as a demonstration that out-of-state powered transmitted to it was not
recognized as of the same value as in-state electricity, therefore Michigan should not pay
a share of power line tariffs transmitting power from out of state that did not have equal
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Justice Scalia, concurring in the majority prior opinion in West Lynn
Creamery, submitted that, “subsidies for in-state industry . . . would clearly
be invalid under any formulation of the Court’s guiding principle” for
“dormant” Commerce Clause cases.86
B. California Challenge
1. The Trial Court Finding Unconstitutional Regulation
The California Low Carbon Fuel Standard (“LCFS”) rule is to reduce
the carbon content of transportation fuels sold in California by 10% by the
year 2020 from the year 2010 baseline.87 The LCFS is a “set of
regulations to govern the marketing of gasoline-ethanol blends sold in
California.”88 CARB’s LCFS rule includes the lifecycle GHG emissions
of fuel, including emissions produced during production and transportation
of fuels to California. Corn-derived ethanol produced in the Midwest is
assigned a higher carbon intensity score than chemically similar cornderived ethanol produced anywhere in California, regardless of its
transportation within California.89
The LCFS rule was challenged in two court cases alleging that it violated
federal and state law. One was under California state law claims, 90 and
another under federal Constitutional law in Rocky Mountain Farmers
Union v. Goldstene. Plaintiffs alleged that CARB discriminated against
interstate commerce and fuels produced out of state.
The Rocky Mountain litigation on the LCFS program aspects of AB 32
in federal court caused standing issues for several of the plaintiffs.91 The
court held that individual plaintiffs have not provided evidence of
individual standing, but that at least one of the industry plaintiffs’ members
suffered an actual injury, which establishes association standing.92 To
recognition and benefit. Instead of supporting its position, this assertion caused Judge
Posner to respond to this assertion, even though it was not the tariff issue before the
Court. Id.
86. 512 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring).
87. California Air Resources Board, Final Regulation Order.
88. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1099 (E.D.
Cal. 2011); 719 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1177 (E.D. Cal. 2010), petition for cert. filed, No. 131148 (Mar. 20, 2014).
89. Id. at 1177–78.
90. See infra Section IV.
91. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1099 (E.D.
Cal. 2011), petition for cert. filed, No. 13-1148 (Mar. 20, 2014).
92. Id. at 1099–1100. The Court points to two specific affidavits that name specific
plants that will be harmed by the LCFS and alleges injuries that have been suffered and
therefore the Court finds the first prong satisfied. Id. Growth Energy has previously
submitted evidence that satisfy this prong.
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establish associational standing, the industry plaintiffs have to satisfy
three prongs: Its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right, the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s
purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires
the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.93
Of note, state regulation of biofuels was before the Supreme Court 25
years before. In New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, the Supreme Court
struck as unconstitutional a state law that gave favorable tax treatment to
ethanol produced in-state, and held that health impacts were only incidental
benefits, while the Commerce Clause violation was not permitted.94
In December 2011, the Eastern District of California upheld plaintiffs’
argument, invalidating certain parts of the LCFS rule and enjoining the
rule’s enforcement, as it “discriminates against out-of-state corn-derived
ethanol while favoring in-state corn ethanol and impermissibly regulates
extraterritorial conduct.”95 “Regulating out-of-state conduct” is not the
only test applied under the dormant Commerce Clause; the broader
definition of discrimination “simply means differential treatment of instate and out of state economic interests that benefits the former and
burdens the latter.”96 However, defendants had not met their burden to

93. Id. at 1099.
94. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 279 (1988).
95. 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. CARB attributed the difference in carbon intensity
values to multiple scientific factors in addition to geographic location factors (emissions
related to shipping or transportation of fuel). The court relied upon a “table” of Carbon
Intensity values generated by CARB.
96. Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore.,
511 U.S. 93, 99. Under the Pike test, courts will uphold a non-facially discriminatory
statute “unless the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.” 397 U.S. at 142.
“A facially-neutral statute that imposes an incidental ‘burden on interstate commerce
incommensurate with the local benefits secured,’ Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n, 272 F.3d at 108,
would fail the balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). A statute or regulation would discriminate against commerce
itself when the statute
(i)
shifts the costs of regulation onto other states, permitting in
state lawmakers to avoid the costs of their political decisions,
(ii) has the practical effect of requiring out-of-state commerce to be
conducted at the regulating state’s direction, or
(iii) alters the interstate flow of the goods in question, as distinct from the
impact on companies trading in those goods.”
Entergy v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013), quoting Am. Booksellers Found. v.
Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2003).
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show that there is not a nondiscriminatory means to adequately serve their
objective.97 The court found that CARB had several other means to address
the state’s purpose without discriminating against out-of-state fuel
products.98 The court here incorporates the Dean Milk requirement to
choose the least discriminatory or intrusive on interstate commerce
mechanism to regulate, when it balances local purpose against a statute
which either discriminates on its face or impermissibly controls conduct
outside its borders.99
The court held that the LCFS “may not impose a barrier to interstate
commerce based on the distance that the product must travel in interstate
commerce.”100 Even though the LCFS does benefit some other out-ofstate producers or burdens some in-state producers, the court finds that
this does not absolve the LCFS from a finding that it discriminates on its
face:101 “[L]egislation favoring in-state economic interests is facially
invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause, even when such legislation
also burdens some in-state interests or includes some out-of-state interests in
the favored classification. Daghlian v. DeVry Univ., 582 F.Supp.2d 1231,
1243 (C.D.Cal.2007).”102
2. Indirect Regulation Beyond State Borders
The Rocky Mountain plaintiffs alternatively asserted that strict scrutiny
applies for an additional reason because under the Commerce Clause, one
state’s laws cannot “control conduct beyond the boundary of the
state.”103 Defendants countered that the only effects the LCFS may have on
out-of-state producers are indirect and therefore not directly regulating
outside California’s boundaries.104 The Court found for plaintiffs, identifying
the issue as “whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control
97. Supra note 92, at 1093. The Court did recognize that lifecycle analysis is a
widely accepted national and international approach to reduce carbon emissions, but this
does not mean there is not a nondiscriminatory means to achieve this goal on a local level.
Id. The Rocky Mountain plaintiffs offered several nondiscriminatory alternatives
including a tax on fossil fuels or solely regulating tailpipe emissions. Id. at 1093–94.
98. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
99. See supra note 92, at 1093.
100. Id. at 1089.
101. Id. at 1089. For example, Brazilian sugarcane ethanol has a lower intensity
score than some Californian corn ethanol and in-state producers of corn ethanol are
penalized when importing corn from out-of-state. Id.
102. Id. at 1089 (quoting Daghlian v. DeVry Univ., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1243 (C.D.
Cal.2007)).
103. Id. at 1090. The Rocky Mountain plaintiffs cite such examples as the LCFS
regulating land use in the Midwest and deforestation in South America rather than solely
regulating ethanol carbon emissions within the borders of California. Id. at 1090–91.
104. Id. at 1091.
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conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”105 “While a State may seek
lower prices for its consumers, it may not insist that producers or consumers
in other States surrender whatever competitive advantages they may
possess.”106 There are other regulatory mechanisms to do this that raise
zero Constitutional concerns, although California did not elect these for
this program.107
The trial court points out that states cannot place restrictions on imports “in
order to control commerce in other states.”108 The court held that “this type
of regulation ‘forc[es] a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State
before undertaking a transaction in another,’ causing the LCFS to ‘directly
regulate[ ] interstate commerce.’”109
3. The Pending Preemption Challenge
Plaintiffs alternatively argued that CARB’s LCFS regulations were
preempted by federal environmental law,110 when LCFS closed off
California to those federally grandfathered bio-refineries which would
need either to not participate in the California ethanol fuel market or

105. Id.
106. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580
(1986); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935) (holding that
one state “has no power to project its legislation into [another state] by regulating the price
to be paid in that state for [products] acquired there”).
107. See Steven Ferrey, Solving the Multi-Million Dollar Constitutional Dilemma, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
108. Supra note 92, at 1092. The LCFS requires all commercial providers, whether
within the state or outside, to detail the entire geographic pathway of the fuel during its
lifetime so that CARB may assign it a carbon intensity score. Id.; see also Carbone, 511
U.S. at 383.
109. Supra note 92, at 1092.
110. Id. at 1101. The petitioners asserted that the 2007 amendment to the Clean Air
Act, the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), precluded CARB from its statelevel LCFS program. California retorted that regulating emissions is within traditional
state police power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of citizens, and “[a]ir pollution
prevention falls under the broad police powers of the statesFalseEnvironmental regulation
traditionally has been a matter of state authority.” Oxygenated Fuels Ass’n v. Davis, 331
F.3d 665, 668 (9th Cir. 2003). There is a “savings clause” for states in the Clean Air Act
(“nothing in this act shall preclude or deny the right of any state or political subdivision
thereof to adopt or enforce [any pollution standard]. . .except that such State . . . may not
adopt or enforce any standard which is less stringent than the [federal] standard. . .” 42
U.S.C. § 7146).
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reduce their carbon emissions, although not so required by federal law.111
Defendants opposed the Plaintiffs’ preemption motion not on their
merits, but on procedural defenses based on lack of standing and lack of
causation.112
The court held that while individual plaintiffs had not provided evidence
of individual standing, but that at least one of the industry plaintiff
members suffered an actual injury which establishes associational
standing.113 Because the state opposed an as-applied preemption challenge
while the plaintiffs opposed a facial challenge, the court required future
briefing on these different issues and the standards of review that should
be used,114 and denied “without prejudice the Rocky Mountain plaintiffs’
summary judgment motion related to its preemption claim.”115
4. The Ninth Circuit 2013 Reversal with Dissent
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in 2013, reversed the federal district
court opinion on the unconstitutionality of the California LCFS.116 The
trial court decision was overturned as to the standard of review to apply
to the regulation, whether the regulation was facially discriminatory and
violated the Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause, and whether the
California action was impermissibly extra-territorial.117 With a dissenting
judge, the 2-1 Circuit majority did not apply strict scrutiny to the California

111. Supra note 92, at 1095. These federal objectives were asserted by the
plaintiffs to include reducing the United States’ greenhouse emissions, enhancing energy
independence and protecting pre-existing investment in renewable energy. Plaintiffs
argue that Congress struck a balance by not mandating pre-existing bio-refineries to reduce
their lifecycle carbon emissions as outlined in the statute. Id. at 1094–95.
112. Supra note 92, at 1095. A plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in
fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;
and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that there injury will be redressed by
a favorable decision. Id.
113. Id. at 1099–1100. The Court points to two specific affidavits that name specific
plants that will be harmed by the LCFS and alleges injuries that have been suffered and
therefore the Court finds the first prong satisfied. Id. Growth Energy had previously
submitted evidence that satisfies this prong. Id. at 1100. The Court addressed whether
they would have associational standing, by plaintiffs demonstrating qualification under the
three following prongs: “its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right; the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members
in the lawsuit.” Id. at 1099.
114. Id. at 1102–03.
115. Id. at 1103.
116. Rocky Mountain farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013).
117. Id.
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regulation, and instructed on remand that a balancing test be applied
pursuant to Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc, 397 U.S. 137 (1970).118
The Rocky Mountain majority decision states that it is not
unconstitutional for a state to impose a regulation whose effect is for only
out-of-state commerce to disproportionately purchase additional credits
and pay additional fees: “California may regulate with reference to local
harms, structuring its internal markets to set incentives for firms to
produce less harmful products for sale in California.”119 Because goods
are transported using fossil fuels, this discriminates, by its design, on the
distance any goods travel in interstate commerce and imposes costs based
on the point of origin of the commerce. However, there was a dissenting
opinion—of four federal judges who have ruled on this specific case at
the trial and appellate levels, two of the four found it unconstitutional.
Including the separate legal challenge to the LCFS based on state law
claims before a California superior court,120 discussed infra.,121 three of
the five judges who have ruled on the LCFS program held it to be
illegal.122
The dissent in the Ninth Circuit decision found there is facial
discrimination.123 Any geographic discrimination by a state, whether
along state or other geographic lines, is subject to strict scrutiny by the
court, as cited in the dissent: “Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. 100 (“In
making [the] geographic distinction, the [regulation] patently discriminates
against interstate commerce.”). 124 The burden is on California to
demonstrate that no less burdensome regulatory incentives were available
to control GHGs, and the dissent notes that at oral argument, California
admitted that there were less burdensome alternatives on interstate
commerce than “to use lifecycle analysis to reduce GHG emissions.”125

118. Id. at 1078.
119. Id. at 1090, 1104.
120. Poet, LLC v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., Cal. Ct. App., No. F064045 (June 3, 2013); see
infra.
121. See infra Section IV.A.3.
122. This includes 2 of 4 federal judges, and the state court judge.
123. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107, 1108 (9th Cir.
2013) (Murguia, J., dissenting) (relying on Supreme Court decision in Chem. Waste Mgmt,
Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1994) (“additional fee [on imported commerce] facially
discriminates.”)).
124. Id. at 1108.
125. Id. (quoting hearing transcript).
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Where a state statute is drafted in a fashion which is facially neutral
rather than expressly discriminatory, a court applies a strict scrutiny
standard where the state law has a discriminatory effect .126 Justice
Scalia, concurring in the majority prior opinion in West Lynn Creamery,
noted that, “subsidies for in-state industry . . . would clearly be invalid
under any formulation of the Court’s guiding principle” for “dormant”
Commerce Clause cases.127 Fees imposed on out-of-state commerce have an
identical effect to subsidies for in-state industry. Strict scrutiny almost always
results in the state action being found unconstitutional.128 Appeals continue
in this already-reversed case.
However, notwithstanding the reversal with dissent by the Ninth Circuit in
California, there are relevant developments elsewhere in the federal
circuit court of appeals on state energy regulation. Two other federal
circuit courts rendered decisions in mid-2013, contemporaneously with
the Ninth Circuit decision on the California LCFS, adjudicating state
versus federal Constitutional authority to regulate aspects of sustainable
energy:
 In 2013, the 7th Circuit unanimously declared that it is a
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitutional
for a state to treat renewable power originating out-of-state
differently than renewable power originating in-state.129
 In 2013, the 2nd Circuit unanimously affirmed the trial court
that it is unconstitutional for a state to regulate low-carbon
power in a way which affects the ability of energy commerce
to freely flow interstate across state lines, noting that the
matter was not yet ripe for review on the facts presented.130

126. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391 (“ordinance is no less discriminatory because in-state
or in-town processors are also covered by the prohibition.”); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977); see also Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992).
127. West Lynn Creamery, Inc., 512 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring).
128. See New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 279–80 (1988)
(preference for in-state ethanol is discriminatory and environmental benefits are incidental
and not a justification).
129. Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013). Judge
Richard Posner, in an unanimous decision relied on a 2013 law review article on
Constitutional energy jurisdiction issues authored by Professor Ferrey. The Seventh
Circuit declared unconstitutional state regulation limiting state renewable portfolio
standards to in-state generation, as a violation of the Commerce Clause: “it trips over an
insurmountable constitutional objection. Michigan cannot, without violating the commerce
clause of Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy.” Id.
130. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 430, 433 (2nd Cir.
2013).
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These three contemporaneous 2013 federal circuit court decisions all
hinge on the restrictions imposed by the Constitution’s dormant Commerce
Clause and Supremacy Clause on state regulation of energy, wherein the
state must demonstrate use of the least discriminatory alternatives. So
there is disagreement between state and federal courts as to the legality of
the California LCFS, between district and appellate federal court judges,
within the federal court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and more
generically between different federal circuit courts on the application of
constitutional principles to state energy regulation which favors the state
and burdens interstate commerce in energy. Amid this disagreement, the
California LCFS and A.B. 32 carbon regulation labor on.
IV. CALIFORNIA CARBON AND STATE LAW
Several of the new legal challenges to California sustainable energy and
carbon control policies are raised pursuant to state law. We analyze these
in two dimensions:



Where the state environmental agency is accused of not
following state environmental laws; and
Where state agencies are accused of violating the
administrative procedures which govern their operations.

State law challenges should be more straightforward for state government
to side-step than Constitutional challenges. In any challenge, states enjoy
particular deference in their exercise of jurisdiction—there is a presumption
against implied preemption of state law131—and states receive deference
in their interpretation of their own state statutes. So despite base-line
expectations of success for a state agency challenged for violation of state
law with regard to carbon, California has not prevailed in the majority of

131. See STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, at
168 (Wolters Kluwer/Aspen, 6th ed. 2013); Chevron v. NRDC, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984);
U.S. v. Mead Corp, 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944);
City of Arlington v. FCC, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (May 20, 2013) (“administrative
agency is entitled to deference in its . . . scope of its own regulatory authority,” or
“jurisdiction. ”); Ann Graham, Chevron Lite: How Much Deference Should Courts Give
to State Agency Interpretation, 68 LA. L. REV. 1105 (2008); G. Vairo, Making Younger
Civil: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State Court Proceedings – A
Response to Professor Stavitz, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 173 (1989); Antonio Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administration Interpretations of Law, 3 DUKE L. REV. 511 (1989).
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significant legal challenges to date under state law to A.B. 32, the
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.132
A. California Environmental Agency Environmental Violations
When the California carbon regulation has been challenged for
violating state environmental regulations, it is typical that the claims will
simultaneously include alleged violation of state administrative procedure.
1. Scoping the Regulation
This first case set back the entire implementation of A.B. 32 for
approximately a year from its scheduled implementation to correct
discretionary agency deficiencies. California in, 2011, lost a suit against
its carbon control cap-and-trade regulation, resulting in an additional year
of delay in start of the entire regulatory program. 133 The petitioners
argued that CARB violated A.B. 32 by excluding whole sectors of the
economy from GHG emission controls, adopting a cap-and-trade program
without determining whether such potential reduction measures achieved
the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective reductions
possible, failing to sufficiently evaluate the total costs and benefits to the
environment, economy and public health before selecting the program
Scoping Plan, and failing to consider all relevant information regarding
GHG emissions reduction programs used throughout the world, as required,
prior to recommending a cap-and-trade option.134 The petitioners claimed

132. Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, A.B. 32, 2005-2006 Sess. (Cal.). The
California Assembly passed Assembly Bill 32, signed into law by Governor Schwarzenegger on
September 27, 2006, available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm.
133. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., CGC—09-509562 (Cal. Super. Ct.
2011) (Tentative Statement of Decision: Order Granting in Part Petition for Writ of
Mandate) available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/archive/A132165.PDF. Ass’n
of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487 (2012), Lisa Weinzimer &
Geoffrey Craig, Delaying California CHG Cap-and-Trade Regime a Year Draws Support
From Stakeholders, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., July 4, 2011, at 11–12. The court issued a writ
of mandate enjoining CARB from any further cap-and-trade rulemaking until 2013. Ass’n
of Irritated Residents, (Cal. Super. Ct. 2011) CGC–09–509562.
134. Id. Order Granting In Part Petition For Writ Of Mandate (9th Cir. January
2011), rev’d on appeal unanimously. The plaintiffs’ petition alleged specifically that the
CARB scoping plan “(a) fails to achieve the maximum technologically feasible and costeffective reductions; (b) fails to require emissions reduction measures for significant
sources of emissions, namely industrial and agricultural sources; (c) does not develop any
policies to avoid the pitfalls of other greenhouse gas emission trading programs and fails
to address how [C]ARB will monitor and enforce reductions in a regional market; (d) fails
to assess the likely impacts of proposed policy choices and regulatory programs and fails
to propose policies to ensure that compliance with chosen measures will not
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that CARB violated the California Environmental Quality Act135 in the
preparation of its Functional Equivalent Document.136
As to basic administrative process, the court held that CARB did not
abuse its discretion and was not arbitrary and capricious in making its
program choices.137 However, the court did find that CARB improperly
approved its Scoping Plan prior to completing the legally required
environmental review.138 The court held that the scoping plan was selected
by CARB prior to the public hearing on it, rather than after, and that the
CEQA review was “approved” prior to the requirement to take public
comment prior to a decision. The court issued a writ of mandate enjoining
CARB from any further cap-and-trade rulemaking until it complied with
CEQA by analyzing alternatives to cap-and-trade and considered relevant
public comments. 139 This delayed the program implementation for
approximately a year until 2013.140
When re-promulgated a year later, in 2012, with a more robust
consideration of alternatives, CARB’s Climate Change Scoping Plan and
choice of the previous cap-and-trade option was upheld by a state court.141
So, this successful state law challenge did not change the ultimate result,
however it required the California state agency to reinitiate that choice,
and thereby employing the correct process and consume another year
delaying the program.
2. Large Project CEQA Applicability
An environmental organization challenged a California statute that
attempted to limit the scope of review of environmental approvals for
disproportionately impact already overburdened communities; and (e) fails to prevent
increases in criteria and toxic co-pollutant emissions.” Id.
135.
The California environmental statute is somewhat similar to the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
136. This alleged that CEQA was violated by “1) failing to adequately analyze the
impacts of the measures described in the Scoping Plan, (2) failing to adequately analyze
alternatives to the Scoping Plan; and (3) impermissibly approving and implementing the
Scoping Plan prior to completing its environmental review.” Ass’n of Irritated Residents
v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 206 Cal. App. 4th at 7.
137. Id. Tentative Statement of Decision: Order Granting In Part Petition For Writ
of Mandate (9th Cir. January 2011) rev’d on appeal.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487 (2012).
141. Id.
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carbon-neutral development projects which would spend at least $100
million on construction in the state.142 The California statute would truncate
review of a challenge to compliance with the California Environmental
Quality Act. A.B. 900143 allowed legal challenges filed pursuant to alleged
failures under the California Environmental Quality Act to bypass trial
court and go directly to a state court of appeal on a fast-track. When A.B.
900 was challenged, the court held that such limitations were
unconstitutional given constitutional mandates allowing writs of mandamus
to be brought in trial courts, by restricting the original jurisdiction of
superior courts as conferred in the California constitution.144 The successful
plaintiff environmental group subsequently requested that California
reimburse its attorney fees for having pursued California to undue an
unconstitutional action.
3. Liquid Fuels
As discussed above,145 California’s low carbon fuel standard (LCFS)
was “designed to reduce California’s dependence on petroleum” and “to
stimulate the production and use of alternative, low-carbon fuels in
California.”146 The LCFS regulates transportation fuels that are “sold,
supplied, or offered for sale in California” and focuses on the “carbon
intensity” of fuels, a metric designed to assess “the amount of lifecycle
greenhouse gas emissions, per unit of energy of fuel delivered, expressed
in grams of carbon dioxide per megajoule.”147 California’s LCFS requires
that fuel suppliers reduce the carbon intensity of gasoline and diesel fuel
by 10 percent at the conclusion of the year 2020, from 2010 levels as its
baseline.148 Ethanol is the only biofuel given an increased carbon rating
based on land-use changes.149
In a case distinct from a similar suit on the merits by other parties under
Constitutional principles in federal court,150 the largest ethanol producer

142. A new headquarters in Cupertino for Apple Corporation and a new 750-megawatt
Solar Project in Riverside County had qualified for this limitation, prior to challenge.
143. CAL. PUB. RESOURCES CODE § 17,785.
144. Planning and Conservation League v. California, No. RG 12626904 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Mar. 29, 2013), available at http://apps.alameda.courts.ca.gov/domainweb/service?
Servicename=DomainWebService&PageName=Image&ID=2&Parent=20429158&Action=
28915510.
145. See supra Section III.B.1.
146. Cal. Air Res. Bd., California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard: Final Statement of
Reasons 457 (Dec. 2009).
147. Id. at 5, 923.
148. Id. at 461.
149. See id. at 19, 21.
150. See supra Section II.

118

FERREY(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE)

[VOL. 5: 95, 2013–14]

10/6/2016 8:40 AM

Carbonite Legal Conflict in California
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW

in the United States challenged the LCFS rule in California state court,
alleging a failure to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act
and the state Administrative Procedure Act (APA).151 Plaintiff Poet, LLC
challenged the LCFS regulations on the ground that CARB violated the
APA by excluding certain emails sent by consultants not being included
in the rulemaking file made available to the public.152 The trial court found
against the challengers, but subsequently was reversed on appeal,153 holding
that California had, in fact, violated CEQA and the California APA by
approving the regulation before the required review under CEQA, 154 and
had improperly deferred formulating required mitigation measures.155
However, after ruling against the state, the court refrained from enjoining
the regulation under state law.156 The California appeals court denied the
state’s request for rehearing. 157 The parties were directed to submit
comments about remedies for these violations.158
B. California Administrative Procedure Challenges
There also are challenges which contest administrative aspects of the
decision made by the state, without specifically implicating CEQA or
other environmental laws.
1. Taxes or Fees
Approximately 350 business with approximately 590 facilities are
required to obtain and surrender to the state credits in the first phase of the
carbon program.159 In the first A.B.32 compliance period, approximately 90%
151. Poet, LLC v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 218 Cal. App. 4th 681, 707 (Aug. 8, 2013) (as
modified on denial of rehearing). Poet argued that CARB failed to respond to numerous
public comments, that it omitted documents from the rulemaking file, and that the LCFS
will lead to increased GHG emissions, not the reductions it promises. Poet alleged that
CARB’s LCFS rule exceeds the scope of authority delegated to it by the legislature. See
id. at 708.
152. Id. at 698. The emails spoke of the computer model that CARB used to calculate
the indirect carbon emissions attributable to ethanol due to land-use changes caused by the
increased demand for the crops used to produce ethanol.
153. Id. at 709, 766.
154. Id. at 726.
155. Id. at 738–39.
156. Id. at 767.
157. Id. at 681.
158. Id. at 681.
159. Id. at 767.
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of allowances are allocated free of charge to regulated entities.160 As a
secondary source to procure allowances, there are CARB allowance
auctions161 and secondary market trades. In the California system, for
auctions there are both floor prices162 and mechanisms to restrain too high
allowance prices.163 The cost of California carbon credits advanced in
auctions from an initial price of $10.09 in November 2012, to $13.62 in
February 2013, to $14.00 in May 2013.164
As the law was scheduled to become effective in 2012, California
enacted four pieces of legislation to direct the flow of the anticipated
substantial auction.165 The auction revenues were challenged by the
160. CALIFORNIA AIR R ESOURCES BOARD , APPENDIX J: ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/capv4appj.pdf.
161. Covered Entities may opt to trade allocated allowances by consigning allowances to
CARB for sale through auction. The first two auctions were held on November 14, 2012
and February 19, 2013. Auctions are open to Covered Entities, as well as a wide variety
of other stakeholders, including opt-in Covered Entities (entities in a covered sector but
which emit less than 25,000 MTCO2e) and so-called “voluntary associated entities,” such
as brokers and derivatives clearing organizations. almost 13 million 2013 vintage
allowances which cleared at a price of $13.62, and 9.6 million 2016 vintage allowances,
about half of which sold at $10.71 each. CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, CALIFORNIA AIR
RESOURCES BOARD QUARTERLY AUCTION 2, available at http://www.arb.
ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/february_2013/auction2_feb2013_summary_results_repor
t.pdf. The price of allowances is managed by a limited price-collar mechanism which
includes an escalating auction reserve price and a price containment procedure.
162. To control the floor price, CARB sets a reserve price for each auction below
which no allowances may be sold. This reserve price was $10 in the first auction in 2012,
then $10.71 in 2013, and will increase annually by five percent plus the rate of inflation.
CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, ADDITIONAL AUCTION 1 SUMMARY STATISTICS, and
Auction 2 available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/november_2012/
auction1_summary_statistics_2012q4nov.pdf.
163. To contain prices on the upper end, CARB is setting aside a pool of allowances
which will be offered if prices exceed certain thresholds. Thus, of the total allowances
available, CARB will reserve one percent of the allowances from budget years 2013-2014,
four percent of the allowances from 2015-2017, and seven percent of the allowances
from 2018-2020 for purposes of relieving rising prices should they occur. CAL. CODE OF
REGS. tit. 17, § 95870(a). This reserve will total 121.8 million MTCO2e over the length
of the program. The price of reserve allowance will increase annually at five percent plus
the cost of inflation. CAL. CODE OF REGS. tit. 17, § 95913(e)(3).
Allowances from future budget years are not placed in the reserve until the relevant year
begins, however, all allowances currently in the reserve are available at each reserve sale.
CAL. CODE OF REGS. tit. 17, § 95913(e). A percentage of the reserve allowances are made
available as allowance prices reach certain thresholds. For example, in 2013 the
containment reserve will offer one third of the allowances in the reserve if allowance prices
reach $40, with another third to be released if the cost increases to $45, and another third
at $50. CAL. CODE OF REGS. tit. 17, § 95913(e).
164. Carolyn Whetzel, State’s Greenhouse Gas Allowances Sell for $14 per Ton in
Third Auction, 44 E.R. 1556 (Issue No. 21, May 24, 2013).
165. Poet LLC v. CARB, Petition, at 13. S.B. 1018 requires that auction proceeds be
deposited in a Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund and authorizes auction funds to be lent to
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California Chamber of Commerce.166 The complaint asserts that A.B. 32
does not authorize CARB to impose fees other than those needed to cover the
ordinary administrative costs of implementing a state emissions
regulatory program.167
This is distinct from a separate, subsequent 2013 suit brought by different
plaintiffs challenged the California greenhouse gas allowance auctions
under its emissions cap-and-trade program as an illegal, unconstitutional
tax or fee.168 In the state law challenge, plaintiff Morning Star argues
that the auction revenues cannot be characterized as valid regulatory fees
because the revenues are not limited to the reasonable costs of any
regulatory program, there is no relationship between the revenues generated
and the benefits bidders receive, there is use of revenues for purposes
unrelated to the regulatory program, and no CARB authority to generate

the State General Fund. See Cal. Health & Saf. Code §§ 16428.9, 16428.9. A.B. 1463
states that the Director of Finance may allocate or otherwise use an amount of at least $500
million of the funds raised, while making commensurate reductions to General Fund
expenditure authority, for the purpose of advancing the goals of A.B. 32. A.B.1463, § 15.11
Governor Brown subsequently requested such a loan of $500 million in 2013. California
S.B. 535 in 2012 was enacted to require at least 25% of the funds raised from auction of
carbon credits to benefit disadvantaged communities, and a least 10% used for projects in
communities that are identified as disadvantaged. 2012 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. ch. 505 (S.B.
35); see CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 39713. Utilities are required to auction their allocated
allowances, obtain the auction revenues, and then rebate them to provide financial rate relief
to their customers. CAL. CODE OF REGS. tit. 17, § 95,892 (d)(3) (2012). Auction proceeds
and allowance value obtained by an electrical distribution utility shall be used exclusively for
the benefit of retail ratepayers of each electrical distribution utility, consistent with the
goals of AB 32, and may not be used for the benefit of entities or persons other than such
ratepayers.
166. Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., Cal. Super. Ct., No. 34-201280001313. The issuance and oversight of offsets has been performed by private parties,
including the Climate Action Reserve.
167. Id. at 9.
168. Morning Star Packing Co. v. CARB, Cal. Super. Ct., No. 34-2013-80001464,
Joint Ruling on Submitted Matters at 11. The suit asks the court to declare that “the auction and
revenue generating provisions” of the cap-and-trade regulation are unconstitutional under
Proposition 13, the ballot initiative that requires a two-thirds vote on taxes, or under
Proposition 26, a ballot initiative requiring a super-majority vote on some fees and levies.
A.B. 32 did not pass on a two-thirds vote, nor did S.B. 1018, A.B. 1532, S.B. 535, and A.B.
1463, which stipulate how the auction revenues must be spent. Plaintiff, Morning Star
Packing, participated in CARB’s two prior auctions, spending $379,860 on allowances.
Complaint.
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billions of dollars of revenues for Califomia by selling emission allowances
at auction.169
The California Chamber of Commerce claimed that CARB itself is
projected to raise a total of $70 million dollars, which is well in excess of
that necessary to regulate the conduct of the entities paying the fees.170 It
asserted that if the revenue raised from auctioning allowances under the
cap-and-trade program is not a tax, but a “regulatory fee,” by law it must
be relative in amount to the burden placed on the payer, and must be spent
on programs that are related to the specific goal of the program reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, rather than for other fiscal purposes.171
The state court initially allowed CARB to employ an auction mechanism
for allowances under A.B. 32.172 This decision decided only that the scope
of the legislative grant was broad enough to allow auction.173 In late 2013,
the state trial court decided that the revenue raised by auction of allowances
under A.B.32 was not an unauthorized new tax, although a close call.174
That decision is now on appeal.
2. In-State Reduction or Global Application?
Offsets are an alternative means to achieve compliance with cap-andtrade carbon regulation, allowing lower-cost reduction opportunities outside
the capped state to be pursued and monetized as tradable credits applied
in California. The quid pro quo for offsets has been the requirement for
“additionality.175 A 2012 lawsuit in California by advocates for low-income
169. Morning Star Packing Co. et al v. CARB Cal. Super. Ct., No. 34-201380001464, Joint Ruling on Submitted Matters (filed June 10, 2013), Petitioners and Plaintiff’s
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Mandate, at 2–3.
170. Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., supra note 167, at 11.
171. Isaac v. City of Los Angeles, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 752 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). To
constitute “regulatory fees” rather than taxes, fees must not exceed the reasonable cost of
the services necessary for the activity for which the fees are charged and for carrying out
the purpose of the regulation, and the fees may not be levied for unrelated purposes. Id.
172. Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., Cal. Super. Ct., No. 34-201280001313.
173. Carolyn Whetzel, Court Upholds California’s Authority to Auction Greenhouse
Gas Allowances, Bloomberg Law State Environment Daily, Aug. 29, 2013. From the
bench, the judge indicated that if it was decided that the California precedent of Sinclair
Paint applied to the A.B. 32 carbon legislation, it would be an illegal tax. Id.
174. See Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., Cal. Super. Ct., No.
34-2012-80001313, Order November 2013; Morning Star Packing Co. v. CARB, Cal.
Super. Ct., No. 34-2013-80001464 (Apr. 16, 2013).
175. “Additionality” is the requirement in most carbon control statutes or regulations that
only “additional” or non-business-as-usual carbon-reduction projects legally qualify to
create carbon “offsets;” “which are tradable credits for compliance with these carbon
policies. See R EGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE , M ODEL R ULE (Jan. 5, 2007)

122

FERREY(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE)

[VOL. 5: 95, 2013–14]

10/6/2016 8:40 AM

Carbonite Legal Conflict in California
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW

interests attacked the California climate control legislation on the basis
that its compliance requirements would be met principally by offsets from
out-of-state or even international locations, without any assurance that the
offsets would be “additional” to business-as-usual policies in
California. 176 Plaintiffs argued that the regulation was ultra vires to the
administrative power of CARB, whose actions were arbitrary and
capricious and not based on a solid administrative record.177 The
California trial court in 2013 rejected both arguments,178 deferring to
CARB’s expertise and experience and demurring to CARB’s choice of
methodology.179
Notwithstanding that states are expected to follow state law and if
challenged in state court generally receive deference to their methods and
choices from the court, California’s record is mixed. The above five
challenges under state law either resulted in the state losing the matter, are
still in the trial court in some form or are still pending on appeal. The legal
carbonite has retarded the timing and clear path for this state carbon
regulation.
V. GOING FORWARD
This Article started by reference to the significant effect of carbonite in
the Star Wars galaxy. It is of note as we go to press, that Disney has
purchased the rights to this virtual galaxy from Lucasfilm180 and is planning
to increase the original 6 Star Wars movies produced by Lucasfilm to a total
of nine, with the next release scheduled soon in 2015.181 Regardless of the
prominence of carbonite freezing of galactic heros in the upcoming films,
will legal fights over A.B. 32 regulation be settled before the next Star
Wars movies are released? The litigation has not ebbed to date, with several
[hereinafter RGGI MODEL RULE], available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/model_rule_
corrected_1_5_07.pdf; U.S. C ONG . R ESEARCH S ERV ., RL34634, CLIMATE CHANGE AND
INTERNATIONAL DEFORESTATION: LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS, at CRS-5, tbl. 1 (2008).
176. Citizens Climate Lobby and Our Children’s Earth Foundation v. California
A.R.B. No. Cal. Super. Ct. CGC-12-5195944, at 12 (2012), (Statement of Decision regarding
Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief).
177. Id.
178. The court concluded that plaintiffs had “failed to demonstrate that the legislature
foreclosed the use of standardized additionality mechanisms or demonstrate that [CARB]
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in promulgating additionality standards.” Id.
179. Id.
180. See Leonard, supra note 2, at 1.
181. Id.
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appeals pending and new challenges threatened.182 There are 17,000 separate
characters that Lucasfilm has catalogued in the Star Wars empire,183 and the
sheer volume of litigation over A.B. 32 and related California sustainable
energy policy suggests that many of them now may have lawyers on
retainer.
One can feel a disturbance in the Force. On issues fundamental to the
California carbon regulatory structure itself, we still await final appellate
court decisions on a California program which at times seems to involve an
amount of resources that could rival what Disney expended to buy the
Star Wars franchise and Lucasfilm.184 One barrier was removed as a “close
call” by a trial court in late 2013.185 Forward progress on A.B. 32 has
been measurably slowed in legal carbonite. Recalling that carbonite also
refers to a brand which supplies encrypted high security,186 after four
years of litigation, things do not seem yet secure.
The recent Ninth Circuit reversal on the legality of A.B. 32 does not
appear to have settled Constitutional questions. The 7th Circuit articulated a
different posture on state discretion to regulate energy without violating the
dormant Commerce Clause187 and certiorari has been requested of the
Supreme Court on this.188 Of note, the U.S. Supreme Court in 2013
interpreted the Constitution to bar a California port’s discretion to regulate
the air impacts of fuel emissions. However, even should the Rocky
Mountain decision remain the final word on the legal viability of the current
LCFS, it may not be the final act. Four states—Alabama, Texas, Nebraska
and North Dakota—indicated they eventually were planning to bring suit
against California claiming that California’s Renewable Portfolio Standard
(RPS) sustainable energy incentive program as unduly burdening interstate
commerce by not fully recognizing renewable power created by out-ofstate power generation units.189
182. See Michael N. Mills, Will California’s 33% Renewable Portfolio Standard
Survive a Commerce Clause Challenge by Other States? A recently filed Colorado Case
May Provide the Answer 6 (May 2011), http://www.stoel.com/Files/TheOverride_Caseof
theMonth_may2011.pdf.
183. LEONARD, supra note 2, at 1.
184. Id. (The price for acquisition was $4 billion).
185. See Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., Cal. Super. Ct., No. 342012-80001313 (Nov. 13 2012); Morning Star Packing Co. v. CARB, Cal. Super. Ct., No.
34-2013-80001464 (Apr. 16, 2013).
186. CARBONITE, supra note 6.
187. Illinois Commerce Commission, et al. v. Federal Regulatory Commission, 721
F.3d 764 (7th Cir. June 7, 2013).
188. Id., petition for cert. filed (Oct. 07, 2013).
189. Michael N. Mills, Will California’s 33% Renewable Portfolio Standard Survive a
Commerce Clause Challenge by Other States? A recently filed Colorado Case May Provide
the Answer, at 6, available at http://www.stoel.com/Files/TheOverride_CaseoftheMonth
_may2011.pdf.
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California sustainable energy and carbon control policy has been a
particular recent target of legal challenges. This is, in part, due to California
having one of the most assertive renewable energy190 and carbon control
programs among the states. 191 Challenged under the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause in 6 significant recent suits, California settled in favor of
challengers or lost 5 of these 6; while the 6th matter was dismissed on
procedural grounds without reaching the merits of the claim, leaving
plaintiffs discretion to re-file the complaint.192 Challenging California’s
low carbon fuel regulation pursuant to the dormant Commerce Clause was
successful at the federal trial court level and was reversed by a split panel
on appeal193 A feed-in tariff to promote sale of renewable power has
separately been declared not legally permissible for California by a federal
court and FERC.194 Prior FERC rulings on this exact issue held that any
190. The California RPS of 33% renewable power by 2020 is one of the most assertive
in the U.S. See id.
191. A.B. 32. California is one of only ten states in the U.S. regulating carbon
emissions. There are only two operating carbon control systems in the U.S., one in
California, and one in the nine Eastern RGGI states. The RGGI states only regulate CO 2
emissions from power plants of greater than 25 MW of capacity of generation, not
including imported power. California, by contrast, regulates 7 greenhouse gas chemicals
(Carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6),
perfluocarbons (PFCs), nitrogen trifluoride (NF3), as well as other fluorinated greenhouse
gases), whether emitted by power generation facilities or other sources of emissions,
including imported power. California allows creation of carbon offsets from 4 sources
(U.S. forest and urban forest project resources, livestock projects, ozone depleting
substances projects, urban forest projects), while RGGi allows the creation of carbon
offsets from 5 options (landfill methane capture and destruction, reduction in emissions of
sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) in the electric power sector, sequestration of carbon due to
afforestation. reduction or avoidance of CO2 emissions from natural gas, oil, or propane
end-use combustion due to end-use energy efficiency in the building sector, and avoided
methane emissions from agricultural manure management operations). When compared,
California is much more assertive than the RGGi states (and all other states) in both the
number of industries and the number of chemicals that it regulates. See Center for Climate and
Energy Solutions, California Cap and Trade, available at http://www.c2es.org/us-statesregions/key-legislation/california-cap-trade.
192. See supra Section II.
193. See supra Section III.
194. Independent Energy Producers Association v. California Public Utilities
Commission, 36 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 1994); S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215 (1995); In
re California Public Utilities Commission, Southern California Edison Company, Pacific
Gas and Electric Company, San Diego Gas & Electric Company, F.E.R.C. Dockets Nos.
EL10-64-000 & EL10-66-000 (July 15, 2010). See also Steven Ferrey, Renewable Subsidies
in the Age of Deregulation, PUB. UTIL. FORT. 22 Dec. 1997; Steven Ferrey, Renewable
Orphans: Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State Level, ELECTRICITY J. 52

125

FERREY(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE)

10/6/2016 8:40 AM

such mandated wholesale power purchase “contracts will be considered
to be void ab initio.”195
The Ninth Circuit Rocky Mountain majority’s decision would stand
somewhat apart from core holdings of Supreme Court interpretation of the
dormant Commerce Clause.196 According to this Ninth Circuit majority
decision, a state environmental purpose to reduce GHGs emitted in the
state is enough to impose regulation and costs on interstate commerce
entering the state.197 Notwithstanding any articulated purpose, the Supreme
Court has expressly held that state environmental purpose does not justify
discrimination that otherwise infringes on interstate commerce.198
How the states handle the legal carbonite inhibiting their regulation and
incentives for renewable energy and carbon control is important, given the
void of initiatives in recent federal regulation.199 California is a key state
because of both the broad scope of its carbon regulation and the large size
of its market share. California and other states can avoid both
Constitutional and state law legal challenges to their sustainable energy
policies by using proven mechanisms. 200 However, few states have done

(2006); Steven Ferrey, Carbon and the Constitution: State GHG Policies Confront Federal
Roadblocks, PUB. UTIL. FORT. 40, Apr. 1, 2009.
195. Connecticut Light & Power Co., ¶ 61,012, 70 F.E.R.C. 61,029–30 (Jan. 11, 1995).
196. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (requirement to
choose the least discriminatory or intrusive on interstate commerce means to regulate,
when it balances local purpose against a statute which either discriminates on its face or
impermissibly controls conduct outside its borders); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617 (1978) (state cannot discriminate against articles of commerce originating in
other states unless there is a “reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”); Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 504 U.S.
353 (1992) (invalidating the provisions of Michigan’s Solid Waste Management Act
which restricted landfill’s ability to accept out-of-state waste); Oregon Waste Systems,
Inc. v. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (invalidating
Oregon’s increased per-ton surcharge on waste generated in other states); Chem. Waste
Mgmt, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1994) (invalidating Alabama’s imposition of an additional
disposal fee on hazardous waste generated outside the state but disposed of within
Alabama); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (“ordinance
is no less discriminatory because in-state or in-town processors are also covered by the
prohibition.”); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977);
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (invalidating equal fee imposed
on in-state and out-of-state commerce, the distribution of which favored in-state
commerce).
197. Rocky Mountain farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
198. See West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 201; Carbone, 511 U.S. at 394.
199. In the past decade, the only significant federal energy legislation, other than tax
incentives, was the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. 15,801, a relatively modest
statute, and the Energy Independence & Security Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. 17,071, an even
more modest law.
200. See supra note 107.
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so.201 The legal status of discretionary state carbon control techniques,
measures, and regulations, is far from finally resolved. Stay tuned for the
next episode in this sequel.

201.

Id.
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